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Non-Technical Summary
The present paper examines the linkage between social security strategies
and redistributive effects in European social transfer systems. It is argued that
the various European systems produce different patterns of redistribution that
may be explained by the adoption of different mixes of social security strategies.
These, in turn, reflect the enduring influence of the three major European social
security traditions (the poor law tradition, the social insurance tradition, and the
welfare state tradition).
In support of this argument, several ideal-typical strategies of social security
are identified, traced back to their traditional roots and discussed from the
viewpoint of economic, sociological and political arguments. Subsequently, a
classification of European social transfer systems is introduced, reflecting the
mixture of the social security strategies employed. For this purpose, a set of
indicators depicting different aspects of social security strategies is invoked.
Using these indicators as input variables, various cluster analyses are carried
out. The results indicate that European social transfer systems may be classified
into four broad regimes to which most of the systems may be assigned fairly
clearly.
Finally, the linkage between the class assignment of the European social
transfer systems and the redistributive patterns they produce is investigated. To
assess the overall redistributive effects, three measures for distributive efficiency
based on the Gini Coefficient, the quintile relation and the percentage of
households below the low income threshold of 60% of median equivalized
income are calculated. We find that the results vary greatly not only between
systems but also between different measures calculated for a given system,
indicating that different systems may affect the various income groups
differently. Consequently, the redistributive impacts across income quintiles are
investigated. We find that the redistributive effects for the various countries
show characteristic profiles that reflect the class assignments identified in our
cluster analyses. The patterns are strikingly similar for countries belonging to
the same cluster but differ markedly between groups. We conclude that the
redistributive effects clearly reflect the cluster assignment of the social transfer
systems, indicating that the redistributive pattern is heavily influenced by the
mixture of social security strategies employed.
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the linkage between social security strategies
and redistributive effects in EU social transfer systems. It is argued
that the various European systems produce different patterns of
redistribution that may be explained by the adoption of different mixes
of social security strategies. In support of this argument, several ideal-
typical strategies are characterized and a classification of European
social transfer systems is introduced. Subsequently, the redistributive
effects of the systems are assessed and the relationship to their class
assignment is investigated. We conclude that the redistributive effects
differ markedly between systems of different classes, indicating that
redistributive patterns are heavily influenced by the adopted strategy
mix.
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11 Introduction
In view of the growing expenditures on social security, the question arises in
how far social security programs actually achieve their goals of removing
poverty, inequality and insecurity of existence. While discussions have
frequently centred on the possible adverse effects of modern welfare states on
the economy’s productive efficiency, the present issue concerns the distributive
efficiency of the social security systems themselves, which is closely connected
to the question of how benefits are allocated to different income groups.
In socio-economic literature, several attempts have been made to explore the
linkage between the effort spent in social security systems, their instruments and
their distributive outcomes. Until the influential contribution of Esping-
Anderson (1990), however, most empirical research has focused on comparisons
between the total amount of social security expenditures. In view of the
manifold nature of social security regulations, assessments on the sole basis of
expenditure level are not sufficient to explain the multi-faceted aspects of the
redistributive outcomes they produce.1 Rather, a multidimensional approach
should be adopted, taking into account not only the magnitude of social security
funds but also the instruments that are employed to allocate social security
benefits to their target population.
Drawing on previous studies that have examined the relationship between
welfare state regimes and their distributive outcomes from a more general point
of view,2 the present paper discusses the linkage between social security
strategies and redistributive effects in European social transfer systems.
Specifically, we focus on the redistributive impacts of expenditures for
monetary social transfers other than pensions (Top) in the EU.3 It is argued that
the various systems produce different patterns of redistribution that can be
explained by the adoption of different mixes of social security strategies. In
section 2, after tracing the traditional roots of European social security systems,
three ideal-typical strategies of social security are identified, defined with
respect to their characteristic features and discussed from the viewpoint of
economic, political and sociological arguments. In section 3 a classification
                                                
 1 Cf. e.g. Castles/Mitchell 1992: 3 ff., Kangas 1994: 347.
 2 See, especially, Esping-Anderson 1990, Castles/Mitchell 1992 and Korpi/Palme 1998.
 3 Following EUROSTAT 1999a, pensions include age and survivors pensions. Top are
restricted to monetary payments and do not include benefits in kind.
2system for European social transfer systems is introduced that reflects the
mixture of social security strategies employed. For this purpose, we invoke a set
of indicators designed to capture the main characteristics of the various social
security strategies. Employing these indicators as input variables, several
methods of cluster analyses are conducted to classify the social transfer systems
in the EU according to similarity. We identify four broad regimes, to which
most of the European systems may be assigned fairly clearly. In section 4, the
linkage between the class assignment of the social transfer systems and their
redistributive effects is investigated. Using data provided by a recent
EUROSTAT investigation4, we find that the redistributive effects clearly reflect
the class assignment established in section 3, indicating that the redistributive
pattern of social transfer systems is heavily influenced by the adopted mixture of
social security strategies and reflects the enduring impact of the three basic
social security traditions in Europe.
2 Social Security in Europe: Traditions and Strategies
Starting from the early 16th century, various traditions of social security have
evolved in Europe, gradually forming ideas and strategies as to how different
social problems may be approached. Drawing on the work of Dixon (1999)5,
three social security traditions that are particularly important for Europe may be
identified and referred to as the poor law tradition, the social insurance tradition
and the welfare state tradition.6 The poor law tradition originates from the
secularization of poor relief stated explicitly in the English Poor Law Acts from
1598 and 1601. Rooted in economic liberalism and Christian values7, the poor
laws adhered to the principle of individual responsibility and work ethics.
Distinguishing between “deserving poor” (“poor by acts of god”, such as
                                                
 4 Cf. EUROSTAT 1999a.
 5 Cf. Dixon 1999: 41 ff.
 6 An “employer-liability-tradition” may be added, which originates in medieval landlordism
and Marxist roots and was significant in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.
In this tradition the employer was considered responsible for social security and its
funding. Social security for workers was considered a legal right which was primarily
distributed according to past work histories, whereas no benefits were to be provided for
anyone capable of self-support through work. Cf. Dixon 1999: 45 ff., 59 ff.
 7 On the role of religion for the evolution of social security cf. e.g. Higgins 1981, Ch. 5.
3orphans, aged, long-term disabled) and “undeserving poor” (“poor by personal
attributes”, such as vagabonds, rioters and able-bodied poor in general), local
government poor law overseers were appointed to provide poor relief to the
incapacitated, send able-bodied to work and punish vagrants and beggars. With
the poor laws, social security was considered a necessary evil rather than an
legitimate function of the state, being associated with stigma, deterrence and
inhuman workhouse conditions.
The social insurance tradition evolved as a reaction to the poor law
experiences and originates in the Prussian Social Security Statutes of the 1880s.
Their goal was mainly to prevent threats to the social order, stemming from the
growing resentment of workers in the face of increasing insecurity in the course
of industrialization. With benefit entitlements depending upon previous
contributions, the insurance tradition was based on personal responsibility along
with the principle of solidarity implicit in risk pooling. The social insurance
tradition has radically changed the attitude towards social security.8 With social
insurance, stigma was removed from the recipient of social security benefits,
rendering them respectability by making benefits an earned right. However, as
benefit entitlements were conditional on past work, the social insurance tradition
was mainly designed to keep regular full-time employees out of poverty, leaving
those outside the regular workforce without protection.
The welfare state tradition is rooted in the humanistic conviction that there
is a common responsibility of the society as a whole for the well-being of all
citizens.9 Deviating from libertarian principles, the common good is given
priority over individual freedom. The welfare state tradition seeks to guarantee a
socially acceptable lifestyle with minimal insecurity for every citizen by
establishing national standards of social rights. Its goal is to promote social
integration and progress towards an equal and more secure society, guaranteeing
social security benefits if specific demographic or health related criteria are met.
With universal social allowances it has produced the only new instrument of
social security in the 20th century. Acknowledging the goal to improve society
by state intervention, it created the notion that social security expenditure is a
desirable form of public expense.
                                                
 8 Cf. Dixon 1999: 55 ff.
 9 Cf. Dixon 1999: 61 ff.
4Originating from the social security traditions described above, three ideal-
typical strategies have evolved in Europe that may be referred to as the social
assistance strategy, the social insurance strategy and the social allowance
strategy.10 The social assistance strategy is heavily rooted in the poor law
tradition. Funding is typically provided by the state. The redistributive goal may
be described as “poverty mitigation”, i.e. the provision of a socially acceptable
minimum support for those with inadequate income for reasons of misfortune.
Vertical redistribution is not an original goal, although it may be an outcome.
Social assistance is targeted on individuals meeting certain criteria of neediness,
the objective being to keep social security expenditures low. As a consequence,
means tests play a prominent role.
Economists have frequently advocated means tests for efficiency reasons,11
arguing that rising social security budgets are inevitably associated with
increasing allocative losses caused by the distortive nature of taxes and
contributions. It is pointed out that in the presence of limited funds an extension
of benefit entitlements to a greater part of the population is bound to leave less
benefits available for the poor.12 On the other hand, social scientists as well as
economists have argued against means tests on the grounds that means testing
reduces incentives for self-protection, as most of a person’s savings have to be
spent before he or she is eligible for benefits. Likewise, means tested benefits
                                                
10 Cf. Esping-Anderson 1990: 21 ff., Hill 1996: 75, Dixon 1999: 4 ff. Additionally, a fourth
strategy may be identified which is currently less important in Europe but may gain
influence in the future. Based on liberalism, the marketization /privatization strategy relies
on market efficiency and emphasizes work and saving disincentives of social security
benefits, drawing support from neoclassical economic theory. It proposes that social
security measures that give rise to dependency and/or poverty traps are socially and
politically unacceptable and that individuals in their self-interest should make provisions
for themselves and not depend on government protection. Emphasis is shifted from
community solidarity to individual responsibility with the objective to minimize economic
distortions and moral hazards and to reduce public outlays. The instruments adopted
include substitutionary and complementary voluntary contracting-out in favour of private
providers as well as mandatory public, occupational or personal pension and savings plans
involving no or minor risk pooling. The redistributive objective is income redistribution
over the individual lifecycle. No horizontal or vertical redistribution is intended. While
liberal economists advocate the marketization/ privatization strategy for efficiency reasons,
social scientists criticize the strategy’s shift from social to economic goals and its down-
playing of equity considerations. Moreover, they warn against the danger that a new
underclass of uninsurables will emerge comprising the most vulnerable who have low
incomes but are obliged to pay the highest contributions.
 11 Cf. e.g. Culyer 1980: 185 ff.
 12 See, e.g., 
5are likely to discourage labour supply, as taking on a job with wages shortly
above the eligibility threshold implies a very high effective marginal tax rate
when the withdrawal of benefits is taken into account.13 Apart from these risks
of the so-called savings- and poverty-traps, the efficiency of means tests is
undermined by high costs of administration and surveillance.14 Moreover,
sociologists and political scientists have warned of a loss of support for social
policy by the middle and higher income classes, as these are unlikely to benefit
from social security measures granted conditionally on means tests.15 Finally, it
has been argued that means tested benefits tend to reinforce social division by
creating a category of “less-respectable” benefits that are granted to people
outside the regular labour market.16
The social insurance strategy originates in the Prussian social insurance
tradition. It is contribution-funded and focuses on specific social groups. The
social security goal is poverty prevention, the redistributive objective may be
described as horizontal redistribution, e.g. from working to currently-non-
working members, from the childless to families with children. Vertical
redistribution is not originally intended, although it may be an outcome. Within
the social insurance strategy two sub-strategies may be identified. With
Bismarck-type social insurance, coverage is strictly limited to specific groups,
particularly workers or even occupations. Benefit entitlement is dependent on
and related to past contributions or earnings. By contrast, Beveridge-type social
insurance aims at a more extensive coverage. Entitlement is dependent on past
contributions but benefits are usually flat-rate, although they may be
differentiated with respect to demographic criteria such as the number of
children.
The social insurance strategy has shifted the concern of social security from
poverty mitigation to poverty prevention. It has thus the merit of having
overcome the problem of inadequate voluntary self-protection due to individual
short-sightedness, adverse selection and imperfect information. Specifically, it
has been argued that social insurance provides a form of social security the
                                                
 13 Cf. Atkinson 1998: 137 f., Hill 1996: 85, Steuerle 1996: 167 ff.
 14 Cf. Hill 1996: 85 f.
 15 Cf. e.g. Atkinson 1998: 137 ff., Binstock 1996: 161, Burtless 1996: 175, De Donder
/Hindriks 1998.
 16 Cf. e.g. Esping-Anderson 1990: 24. Some of the problems associated with means-tested
benefits can be reduced by assessing eligibility via tax returns rather than means tests, as
practized in the Australian system. Cf. Dixon 1999: 45, Hill 1996: 87.
6market can hardly attain.17 For one thing, public social insurance is not affected
by financial market fluctuations, as it is primarily funded by wage-dependent
contributions. Additionally, compared to an insurance provided by a private
company, with public social insurance the risk of insolvency of the insurance
agency is greatly reduced. Finally, by rendering social security benefits an
earned right, the social insurance strategy has removed stigma from the
recipients.
The major shortcoming of the strategy relates to its incomplete coverage.
This is especially obvious for Bismarck-type insurance, which due to its focus
on workers leaves all those outside the group of regular full-time employees
without adequate protection. Specifically, this problem concerns the self-
employed, part-time workers, those in irregular forms of employment and those
outside the workforce. Accordingly, out of the necessity of assessing
entitlements and benefit levels for those with discontinuous work records
increasingly complicated schemes have evolved. For Beveridge-type insurance
the problem of fragmented coverage also applies, albeit to a lesser extent.
However, due to the flat-rate nature of benefits there is the danger that higher
income classes will withdraw their political support for the strategy and take
advantage of contracting-out opportunities wherever possible. Due to the
increasing number of atypical forms of employment and the lack of protection
for those whose earning power has never developed, the insurance strategy is
increasingly found to be insufficient to deal with all problems of social security.
The social allowance strategy is based on the humanistic ideal of common
responsibility and social rights for all citizens originating in the welfare state
tradition. It is funded by the state and considers a guaranteed minimum income,
a right of nation-state citizenship. In contrast to the social assistance strategy,
social allowances are granted irrespective of neediness according to mainly
demographic criteria, such as children and age.18 Entitlement and level of
benefits are not related to past earnings or contributions, as the strategy aims at
universal coverage and vertical income redistribution is considered an original
goal.
The social allowance strategy undoubtedly has the merits of universal
coverage and absence of stigma and deterrence, which rendered it the aspired
                                                
 17 Cf. e.g. Hill 1996: 77 ff.
 18 The most universal social allowance would be the granting of a basic income or citizens
income. Cf. Hill 1996: 77.
7social security strategy for most of the late 20th century. However, universal
social allowances are an expensive instrument that few countries can afford.
Accordingly, in the face of limited budgets there is the danger that it may result
in poor or even inadequate levels of benefits.19 Moreover, it has been argued that
the social allowance strategy carries the risk of increasing state control and
growing welfare dependence, leading to persistent poverty and the emergence of
a welfare-dependent underclass.20
3 A Classification of European Social Transfer Systems
Due to the merits and shortcomings of the three strategies discussed in the
previous section, ideal-type strategies are unlikely to prevail in real-world social
security systems. Rather, a mixture of social security strategies is likely to be
found, with the significance of the various strategies differing from country to
country. To examine how current EU social transfer systems differ with respect
to their adopted social security strategy mixes, we attempt to classify the
European systems into several groups according to the extent to which the
various strategies are employed.
In socio-economic literature, several attempts have been made to classify
welfare states, the most notable studies being Esping-Anderson (1990), Castles
and Mitchell (1992) and Korpi and Palme (1998). While most of these studies
refer to the 18 OECD countries originally investigated by Esping-Anderson, to
our knowledge no attempt has been made to classify the EU systems
specifically. In addition, most of them do not focus exclusively on the social
security strategies employed but also include political factors such as political
orientation, the influence of labour unions etc. For the present purpose, however,
it is desirable to concentrate exclusively on those characteristics of social
transfer systems which are directly related to the social security strategies
employed. Accordingly, in choosing input variables for classification, no
account is taken of factors other than social security statistics and issues
concerning social transfer legislations. Moreover, following Korpi and Palme
                                                
 19 Cf. Hill 1996: 76 f.
 20 Cf. Dixon 1999: 62.
8(1998), attention is paid only to factors relating to the design of social security
programs, whereas no issues depending on distributive outcomes are addressed.
From the characterization of social security strategies established in section
2 we infer that social security strategies may be distinguished according to
funding, benefit levels and benefit entitlements. Accordingly, we introduce the
following pairs of indicators that are designed to capture funding issues, the
level of protection and the conditions for benefit entitlement respectively:21
1. With respect to funding issues the share of Top in GDP and the ratio of
funding by state to funding by contributions is reported;
2. With respect to the level of protection the ratio of minimum income
guaranteed to median equivalized income (MEI) for single adults and an
indicator for income replacement rates of Top (excluding minimum
income guaranteed) is invoked;
3. With respect to the conditions for benefit entitlement share of means
tested benefits in social expenditures and an indicator for the degree of
coverage of Top are employed.
In establishing classifications of welfare systems, quantitative methods have
rarely been employed.22 This is due to the fact that statistical inference is
impeded by the small number of observations that do not permit any sensible
regression analyses. Instead, several heuristic and semi-quantitative
investigations have been conducted. Nonetheless, with all purely qualitative
assessments there is the danger of misjudging class assignments by overvaluing
highly conspicuous features on the cost of neglecting the less obtrusive traits. A
quantitative analysis of class assignments is therefore highly desirable. As has
been noted by Kangas (1994), cluster analysis may be a sufficient method to
determine class assignments in cases where regression analysis must be ruled
out for lack of observations. Cluster analysis is a descriptive statistical
instrument designed to identify a structure of “natural” groupings of cases on the
basis of simultaneously comparing multiple characteristics.23 For this purpose, in
                                                
 21 Details on the variables and indicators employed are given in Appendix A.
 22 The notable exception is Kangas 1994, who classifies 18 OECD countries with respect to
their quality of health insurance, using traditional OLS regression, qualitative comparison
analysis and cluster analysis.
 23 Cf. e.g. Johnson/Wichern 1998: 726.
9a first step measures of distances for the values of input variables between cases
are computed. Subsequently, grouping algorithms are employed to classify the
cases into groups. Basically, hierarchically and partitioning algorithms may be
distinguished. Hierarchical clustering methods proceed by a series of successive
mergers, starting with individual objects and grouping them according to their
similarities.24 Partitioning clustering methods start from an initial partition of
cases into groups and subsequently reassign the cases on the basis of their
distance to cluster means.
In cluster analysis, sources of error and variation are not formally
considered. To check for the stability of our results, several methods of
hierarchical and partitioning cluster analyses are carried out. As to hierarchical
cluster analysis, we conduct average linkage with quadratic Euclidean,
Euclidean and city block distance as well as Ward linkage with quadratic
Euclidean distance.25 Additionally, the partitioning k-means clustering is run to
identify four, five and six clusters respectively. As in cluster analysis different
scales of measurement may greatly affect the results, all variables are
normalized to the range of [0;1].26 The analyses are conducted for the EU15
countries, with the exception of Luxembourg who has been excluded due to
inadequate data.27 As for Finland and Sweden comparable data on MEI are not
available, the relation of minimum income guaranteed to MEI for these
countries cannot be computed. To account for this inadequacy, we first carry out
cluster analyses with all six input variables for the remaining twelve EU
countries. Subsequently, the cluster analyses are run for all fourteen countries
with only five input variables, excluding the relation of minimum income
guaranteed to MEI. The second set of calculations is conducted to achieve a
preliminary indication of the likely class assignment of Finland and Sweden.
However, these results have to interpreted cautiously especially with regard to
                                                
 24 Strictly speaking, this only applies for the so-called agglomerative hierarchical clustering
methods. The less common divisive methods proceed by starting from a single group and
successively assigning the cases to subgroups according to their dissimilarity.
 25 As the Ward linkage method is associated with quadratic Euclidean distance by
construction, association with other measures of distance has no sound theoretical basis.
 26 As the Ward algorithm is based on the presence of differences in variances, which are
cancelled out by the more common z-transformation, the [0,1]-transformation is preferred.
 27 Specifically, in the case of Luxembourg data given in EUROSTAT 1999c do not allow
expenditures to be differentiated according to benefits granted monetary or in kind; also,
no data on the amount of means tested benefits are available.
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the assignment of the southern European countries, as the absence of a universal
scheme of minimum income guarantees is a distinguishing feature of this group.
The results of the cluster analyses can be graphically displayed by so-called
dendrograms.28 The clusters are represented by branches that merge together
when junctions of clusters occur. The positions of these mergers along the
distance axis indicate the level of the aggregate distance measure at which cases
are grouped together: Mergers close to the left-hand side of the dendrogram
indicate that the respective countries are very similar, whereas mergers close to
the right point to considerable dissimilarities. Accordingly, with respect to the
case list on the left-hand side of the diagram cases are listed according to their
similarity: Countries exhibiting very similar characteristics are listed close to
each other, whereas more differing countries appear further apart in the list.
Consequently, from the successive junctions of the branches, groupings and sub-
groupings exhibiting different levels of homogeneity may be identified.
As to the analyses with six input variables and twelve countries, the results
of the hierarchical clustering methods are summarized by the dendrogram plots
in Figure 1a to 1d:
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
                      Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
   C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL       6   òûòø
  P       13   ò÷ ùòòòòòø
  I        9   òòò÷     ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  E        5   òòòòòòòòò÷               ó
  IRL     10   òòòòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòòø     ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  UK      15   òòòòò÷             ó     ó                       ó
  A        1   òòòûòòòø           ùòòòòò÷                       ó
  F        7   òòò÷   ùòòòø       ó                             ó
  B        2   òòòòòûò÷   ùòòòòòòò÷                             ó
  D        3   òòòòò÷     ó                                     ó
  NL      12   òòòòòòòòòòò÷                                     ó
  DK       4   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 1a: Dendrogram; average linkage, quadratic Euclidean distance
                                                
 28 Cf. Johnson/Wichern 1998: 740 ff.
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Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
                      Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
   C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL       6   òûòòòòòòòòòø
  P       13   ò÷         ùòòòòòòòø
  I        9   òòòòòòòòòòò÷       ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  E        5   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷             ó
  IRL     10   òòòòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  UK      15   òòòòòòòòòòòòò÷               ó   ó               ó
  A        1   òòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòø           ùòòò÷               ó
  F        7   òòòòòòòòòòò÷     ùòòòø       ó                   ó
  B        2   òòòòòòòòòòòòòûòòò÷   ùòòòòòòò÷                   ó
  D        3   òòòòòòòòòòòòò÷       ó                           ó
  NL      12   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                           ó
  DK       4   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 1b: Dendrogram; average linkage, Euclidean distance
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
                      Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
   C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL       6   òûòòòòòòòø
  P       13   ò÷       ùòòòòòòòø
  I        9   òòòòòòòòò÷       ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  E        5   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷             ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  IRL     10   òòòòòòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø   ó                 ó
  UK      15   òòòòòòò÷                   ùòòò÷                 ó
  A        1   òòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòø         ó                     ó
  F        7   òòòòòòòòò÷       ùòòòòòòòòò÷                     ó
  B        2   òòòòòòòòòòòòòûòø ó                               ó
  D        3   òòòòòòòòòòòòò÷ ùò÷                               ó
  NL      12   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                                 ó
  DK       4   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 1c: Dendrogram; average linkage, city block distance
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Dendrogram using Ward Method
                      Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
   C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL       6   òûòø
  P       13   ò÷ ùòòòø
  I        9   òòò÷   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  E        5   òòòòòòò÷                                         ó
  IRL     10   òòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø                             ó
  UK      15   òòò÷               ùòòòòòø                       ó
  A        1   òûòòòòòø           ó     ó                       ó
  F        7   ò÷     ùòòòòòòòòòòò÷     ó                       ó
  B        2   òòòø   ó                 ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
  D        3   òòòôòòò÷                 ó
  NL      12   òòò÷                     ó
  DK       4   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 1d: Dendrogram; Ward linkage, quadratic Euclidean distance
The dendrograms shown in figures 1a to 1d show that with all methods
employed, four broad classes of systems may be identified which are separated
at a distance level between 5 and 10 (in 1a and 1d) and between 10 and 15 (in 1b
and 1c) respectively.29 The four southern European countries Greece, Portugal,
Italy and Spain are grouped together, with Spain joining the cluster last,
indicating a possible borderline position of this country. Ireland and the UK are
clearly classified together into a second cluster. A third cluster comprises
Austria, France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Within this group,
Austria and France are separated from Belgium and Germany with all methods
employed. Additionally the Netherlands is distinguished from the rest of these
countries in all calculations based on average linkage clustering, also suggesting
a possible borderline position. The fourth and last cluster is constituted by
Denmark alone.
With k-means clustering, the supposed number of clusters has to be specified
initially. The results obtained in the hierarchical clustering analyses suggest a
                                                
 29 The differences in distance levels at which the junctions occur are due to the different
methods according to which aggregate distances are calculated.  In 1a and 1d quadratic
Euclidean distance is employed, which attributes more weight to large distances; as a
consequence, mergers of very similar cases show up at a lower level of aggregate distance.
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pre-determined number of four, five and six cluster as a sensible choice. The
results are given in table 1 below:
Cluster Assignments
4 Clusters 5 Clusters 6 Clusters
EL 1 1 1
P 1 1 1
I 1 1 1
F 1 1 3
E 1 2 2
A 2 3 3
D 2 3 3
B 2 3 4
NL 2 3 4
DK 3 4 5
UK 4 5 6
IRL 4 5 6
Table 1: k-means clustering, excluding FIN and SE
As the table shows, with four clusters pre-determined the grouping is almost
identical to the results of the hierarchical clustering methods, with the exception
of France who is now grouped together with the southern European countries. In
the five cluster case Spain is set apart from the rest of the southern countries,
lending further support to the borderline presumption mentioned above. With six
clusters, France is reassigned to the group of Austria and Germany, whereas
Belgium and the Netherlands are split from this cluster to form a separate group.
The results for the four-cluster-case roughly coincide with Esping-
Anderson’s (1990) and Kangas’ (1994) classifications for the European
countries, the most notable qualification being that in these studies of the
southern European countries only Italy was included and assigned to the
”corporatist cluster” along with Germany, Austria etc. Moreover, support is lent
to Ferrera’s (1996) reasoning, according to which the southern European
countries follow a distinctive welfare regime that is characterized, amongst other
things,30 by institutional fragmentation, a polarization between generous
                                                
 30 Ferrera also mentions the comparatively high level of pensions for wage earners with a full
career in the institutional labour market, the establishment of National Health Services, the
presence of a peculiar public/private mix of institutions and actors and the persistence of
particularism and clientilism. Cf. Ferrera 1996: 19ff.
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protection within the regular labour market and macroscopic gaps in the non-
institutional market and the absence of a national minimum income scheme. The
arguments and data presented by Ferrera also support the possible border-line
position of Spain and France suggested by the results of cluster analysis.
Turning to the analyses including Finland and Sweden but with input
variables excluding minimum income guaranteed, figure 2a to 2d show the
dendrograms resulting from the hierarchical clustering methods:
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
                      Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
   C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL       6   òûòø
  P       13   ò÷ ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  I        9   òòò÷             ùòòòòòòòòòòòø
  D        3   òòòòòûòòòòòø     ó           ó
  E        5   òòòòò÷     ùòòòòò÷           ó
  A        1   òòòòòûòø   ó                 ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  F        7   òòòòò÷ ùòòò÷                 ó                   ó
  B        2   òòòòòòò÷                     ó                   ó
  IRL     10   òòòòòòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                   ó
  UK      15   òòòòòòò÷                                         ó
  FIN      8   òòòûòòòòòòòø                                     ó
  NL      12   òòò÷       ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø               ó
  SE      14   òòòòòòòòòòò÷                     ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
  DK       4   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 2a: Dendrogram; average linkage, quadratic Euclidean distance
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Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
                      Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
   C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL       6   òûòòòòòø
  P       13   ò÷     ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  I        9   òòòòòòò÷                   ùòòòòòòòòòø
  D        3   òòòòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòø     ó         ó
  E        5   òòòòòòòòòòòòò÷       ùòòòòò÷         ó
  A        1   òòòòòòòòòòòòòûòòòø   ó               ùòòòòòòòòòòòø
  F        7   òòòòòòòòòòòòò÷   ùòòò÷               ó           ó
  B        2   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                   ó           ó
  IRL     10   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷           ó
  UK      15   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                               ó
  FIN      8   òòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòòòòòø                           ó
  NL      12   òòòòòòòòò÷           ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø       ó
  SE      14   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                   ùòòòòòòò÷
  DK       4   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 2b: Dendrogram; average  linkage, Euclidean distance
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
                      Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
   C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL       6   òûòòòø
  P       13   ò÷   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  I        9   òòòòò÷                     ùòòòòòòòø
  D        3   òòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòø       ó       ó
  E        5   òòòòòòòòòòò÷       ùòòòòòòò÷       ó
  A        1   òòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòø ó               ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  F        7   òòòòòòòòòòò÷     ùò÷               ó             ó
  B        2   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                 ó             ó
  IRL     10   òòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷             ó
  UK      15   òòòòòòòòòòò÷                                     ó
  FIN      8   òòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòø                             ó
  NL      12   òòòòòòòòòòò÷       ùòòòòòòòòòòòø                 ó
  SE      14   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷           ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
  DK       4   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 2c: Dendrogram; average linkage, city block distance
16
Dendrogram using Ward Method
                      Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
   C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL       6   òø
  P       13   òôòòòòòòòòòòòø
  I        9   ò÷           ùòòòø
  D        3   òûòòòø       ó   ó
  E        5   ò÷   ùòòòòòòò÷   ó
  A        1   òûòø ó           ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  F        7   ò÷ ùò÷           ó                               ó
  B        2   òòò÷             ó                               ó
  IRL     10   òòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                               ó
  UK      15   òòò÷                                             ó
  FIN      8   òûòø                                             ó
  NL      12   ò÷ ùòòòòòòòø                                     ó
  SE      14   òòò÷       ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
  DK       4   òòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 2d: Dendrogram; Ward linkage, quadratic Euclidean distance
As with the first set of calculations we identify four broad classes of social
transfer systems. Again we find Ireland and the UK in a clearly distinguished
cluster of their own. With all hierarchical methods Sweden and Finland are
assigned to a second cluster together with Denmark, and are now joined by the
Netherlands. The distances shown in the dendrograms suggest that Finland and
the Netherlands resemble the rest of Europe more closely than Sweden and
Denmark, the latter occupying a special position within the Northern in all
calculations conducted. The third group is constituted by Germany, Austria and
Belgium and is now joined by Spain and France, who in the first set of
calculations were identified as borderline cases to the southern group. The latter
is now constituted of Greece, Italy and Portugal. The shift of assignments for
Spain and France is probably due to the disregard of the minimum income
guarantee variable in the present set of calculations, as the absence of a
minimum income guarantee is a characteristic that sets France and Spain apart
from the other countries of the third group.31
                                                
 31 It should be noted that in Portugal a guaranteed minimum income has recently been
introduced.
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The results of k-means clustering for the case of 14 EU countries are given
in Table 2 below:
Cluster Assignments
4 Clusters 5 Clusters 6 Clusters
EL 1 1 1
P 1 1 1
I 1 1 1
F 1 1 1
E 1 2 2
A 2 2 1
D 2 2 2
B 2 2 2
NL 2 3 3
FIN 2 3 3
SE 2 3 4
DK 3 4 5
UK 4 5 6
IRL 4 5 6
Table 2: k-means clustering, including FIN and SE
The results for the analysis with four clusters predetermined largely agree
with the corresponding analysis for the 12 country case, with Sweden and
Finland being added to the group comprising Austria, Germany, Belgium and
the Netherlands. With five clusters predetermined, Spain is again split from the
rest of the southern countries, joining Austria, Germany and Belgium.
Additionally, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden are split off to form a
separate group. Finally, with six clusters, Sweden is separated from the latter
group.
Summarizing the results, we conclude that within the EU social transfer
systems four general types of regimes may be identified. With regard to the
strategy mix adopted, from the normalized values of the indicator variables for
each country given in Appendix B, these regimes may described as follows. The
Southern European Cluster is characterized by medium to low Top expenditures
that are mainly funded by contributions with additional financial support by the
state. Earnings replacements are small, an unlimited guaranteed minimum
income does not exist or varies according to local or regional regulations.
Overall coverage is fragmented and means tests are of medium significance. The
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dominant strategy adopted is Bismarck-type social insurance, which is kept at a
low level and is only marginally supplemented by additional measures of social
assistance or allowances. In the Central European Cluster, Top expenditures are
medium to high and are funded mainly by contributions, with minor support by
the state. Both earnings replacement rates and guaranteed minimum income
levels are medium to high. The degree of coverage is medium to low, the
significance of means tests varies considerably among countries. The dominant
strategy is Bismarck-type social insurance. It is supplemented by social
assistance measures to provide a guaranteed minimum income for those not
covered by the main strategy and a minor amount of social allowances, mostly
in the field of family benefits. The British Cluster has medium to low Top
expenditures which are funded to more than 50% by the state. The level of
guaranteed minimum income is among the most generous throughout the EU
and is complemented by mainly flat-rate earnings replacements. The degree of
coverage is medium to high, with means tests playing a prominent role. The
dominant strategy is Beveridge-type social insurance coupled with social
assistance, aiming at a high degree of coverage while keeping overall
expenditures low through the widespread application of means tests. Finally, the
Northern European Cluster is characterized by high Top expenditures, which are
funded to a large degree by the state. Both earnings replacements rates and the
level of guaranteed minimum income are comparatively high. The degree of
coverage is the highest in Europe, with means tests being of varying importance.
The strategy adopted may be described as Beveridge-type social insurance
supplemented to a comparatively large extent by non-contribution-based social
allowances.
The cluster analyses show that most EU countries can be assigned to one of
these groups fairly clearly.32 With all clustering methods employed, Ireland and
the UK unambiguously form the British cluster. Finland, Sweden and Denmark
are almost unanimously assigned to the Northern cluster. Germany, Belgium and
Austria constitute the core of the Central cluster, whereas Greece, Portugal and
Italy are clear-cut members of the Southern cluster. In addition to these fairly
unambiguous assignments, some borderline cases may be identified. For
instance, France is assigned to the Central cluster with the hierarchical clustering
                                                
 32 A detailed table listing the cluster assignments obtained with all calculations is given in
Appendix C.
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methods but with k-means clustering she is classified into the Southern cluster.
Conversely, in calculations where all input variables are employed Spain is a
clear-cut member of the Southern group, while in the hierarchical calculations
disregarding minimum income guaranteed she is assigned to the Central group.
A closer look at the details shows that within the Southern and the Central
group two subgroups may be identified that differ in the level of protection and
overall expenditure level. Accordingly, depending on the clustering method
employed Spain and France are found in the less generous Central or the more
generous Southern sub-cluster, pointing to a position on the verge of the
Southern and the Central group. Similar considerations apply to the Netherlands,
who with some methods is assigned to the Central cluster, whereas in other
cases she is a member of the Northern group.
4 Redistributive Effects and Social Security Strategies
We now turn to the investigation of the linkage between the cluster assignment
and the redistributive pattern produced by the various European systems. For
this purpose we use data provided by a recent EUROSTAT investigation33 on
the redistributive effects of EU social transfer systems. The study reports the
Gini coefficient, the quintile relation S80/S20, which gives the ratio of the
income share of the 20% richest to the income share of the 20% poorest in total
income, and the percentage of persons below the low income threshold of 60%
MEI for primary equivalized income (PEI) and total equivalized income (TEI),
respectively.34 The results are based on data provided by the second (1995) wave
of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), including all EU15
countries with the exception of Finland and Sweden.
When discussing distributive impacts of social transfers, several aspects
must be taken into account. Firstly, it has been well established that different
measures of inequality assess a given income redistribution differently. For
instance, as has been noted by Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973), the Gini
coefficient by its construction is most sensitive to changes in the lower-middle
                                                
 33 Cf. EUROSTAT 1999a.
 34 In EUROSTAT 1999a, primary equivalized income is defined as net income before Top,
whereas total equivalized income is defined as total disposable income including Top.
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ranges of income distributions.35 By contrast, S80/S20 merely registers changes
affecting the top and bottom quintile but does not react to changes in the
medium range of the income distribution. Finally, the percentage of persons
below 60% MEI only reports changes resulting in a change of the number of
persons below and above the low income threshold but conveys nothing about
the effects on the distribution within the low income group. Accordingly, to
obtain a reasonable picture of redistributive effects, we investigate both the Gini
coefficient and the relation S80/S20 and complement the results by an
examination of the 60% MEI measure when appropriate. Secondly, as Castles
and Mitchell (1992) have pointed out, when assessing the redistributive effects
of social security systems, the initial, pre-transfer inequality must be taken into
account. Especially when pre-transfer inequalities vary greatly, a mere
comparison of post-transfer inequalities may yield a grossly misleading picture,
as post-transfer inequalities tell nothing about the magnitude by which the initial
inequality has been reduced. Consequently, the appropriate measure for
assessing redistributive effects is the percentage reduction of the inequality
measure employed. Thirdly, as the share of Top expenditure varies considerably
between the EU countries, the effectiveness of transfer systems should be judged
in the light of the total amount of expenditure spent in social transfers.
Consequently, for a first look at redistributive effects we calculate the
percentage reduction of initial inequality due to the addition of Top, thus
obtaining the redistributive effects for the three inequality measures considered.
To account for differences in aggregate Top spending, we subsequently divide
the resulting figures by the share of Top in GDP. We thus obtain three figures,
capturing the percentage reduction of each inequality measure considered that is
achieved by investing one percent of GDP in Top. As these relative
redistribution effects basically record outcome in relation to costs, they may also
be interpreted as indicators of distributive efficiency. 36 The results on redistri-
                                                
 35 More specifically, the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient depends on the number of people
in between the donor and the receiver of an income unit transfered. As the relative
frequency of typical income distributions is highest in the lower middle ranges, the Gini
coefficient attaches more weight to transfers affecting these income levels. Cf. Atkinson
1970: 255 f., Sen 1973, 32 f., Cowell 1995: 23. For further details on this subject we refer
to Blackorby/Donaldson 1978.
 36 More specifically, the relative redistribution effect may interpreted as a measure of average
efficiency. Of course, when interpreting the relative redistribution indexes the possibility
must be considered that the reduction of inequality and poverty may be subject to
increasing marginal costs.
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bution effects and relative redistribution effects for the Gini coefficient, S80/S20
and the percentage of persons below 60% MEI are given in Appendix D. As the
diagrams show, the relative redistribution effects vary greatly not only between
systems but also between the different measures calculated for a given system.
With regard to the Gini coefficient, the relative redistribution effect is the
highest for France and Denmark, followed closely by the UK and Ireland and
the rest of the Central cluster. By contrast, with S80/S20 the list is topped by
Ireland and the UK, with France, Spain and the rest of the Central cluster
following only with a considerable gap. The core countries of the Southern
group (Greece, Italy and Portugal) are below average with all three measures. In
general, the Central and the Northern Cluster are ranked higher when judged by
the Gini than by S80/S20, whereas for the British cluster the reverse is true. The
results for the 60% MEI measure are between those for the Gini and S80/S20.
Considering the different reaction of measures to changes in income
distribution mentioned above, the results suggest that, apart from general
differences in distributive efficiency, European social transfer systems also
differ in the extent to which different income groups are favoured. Specifically,
judging from the fact that the Central European cluster ranks best with regard to
the Gini coefficient, we may hypothesize that social transfers in the Central
cluster Top principally affect the middle class. Conversely, the high records with
S80/S20 for the British cluster suggests that in these countries Top strongly
favour the lower income groups.
To evaluate these hypotheses, we examine the redistributive effects of Top
for different income groups. To this end, we first compare the percentage of
total Top that is granted to the income quintiles in each country. As shown by the
tables and diagrams in Appendix E, the share devoted to the lowest quintile is by
far the highest in the British and Northern group (over 50%). Particularly
notable is the high share of Top granted to the top quintile by the Southern cluster
countries Italy, Portugal and Greece (9 to 12%), whereas the British group in
this respect with 4 to 6% is found at the bottom of the list. The Central cluster
members Austria and Belgium and the borderline country France devote
comparatively large shares to the medium quintiles.
Additionally, we examine the amount by which the average income of each
quintile has increased after receiving transfers. For this purpose, we first
calculate the relation TEI/PEI for each quintile, thus obtaining the percentage by
which PEI has been increased after receiving Top. Subsequently, in order to
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attain comparability between countries, we normalize the figures by dividing
them by the sum of percentages over the quintiles for each country. The
resulting figures given in Appendix F indicate the amount by which the different
income groups benefit from Top, taking into account their income situation
before transfers. As the figures show, changes for the lowest quintile are most
favourable in the British cluster and least favourable in the Southern cluster.
Conversely, the higher quintiles benefit most in the Southern cluster, whereas
Ireland and the UK are found at the bottom of the list. In the Central cluster
advantages are comparatively large for the medium quintiles. When plotting
income changes over quintiles for each country, a remarkable result appears: As
the diagrams and figures for variance, skewness and kurtosis given in Appendix
F show, characteristic profiles emerge that reflect the cluster assignments
identified in section 3. The redistributive patterns are seen to be strikingly
similar for countries belonging to the same cluster but differ markedly between
groups. In particular, with respect to the British cluster, the plot is heavily
skewed to the left, whereas for the Southern cluster only slight skewness is
observed. The Northern and Central cluster are found in between, with the
Northern cluster exhibiting stronger skewness to the left.
The analysis of redistributive patterns suggests that for all countries having
been clearly assigned in section 3, the class assignment according to strategies
concurs with the grouping of distributive patterns according to skewness and
kurtosis.37 As to the borderline countries France and Spain, when judged by their
distributive patterns they clearly belong to the group of the Central cluster,
whereas the Netherlands should be assigned to the Northern group.
We conclude that the redistributive effects clearly reflect the cluster
assignments of the EU social transfer systems. This points to the fact that the
redistributive pattern of social transfers is heavily influenced by the adopted
mixture of social security strategies. More specifically, the Beveridge-con-
social-assistance strategy of the British cluster leads to a redistributive pattern
that clearly reflects the simultaneous impact of both the poor law tradition and
the Beveridge-goal of universal coverage. Consequently, the system is highly
favourable to lower income groups, whereas recipients of medium and high
incomes are markedly less favoured. By contrast, the Bismarck-con-social-
                                                
 37 A possible exception could be Belgium, who with regard to her redistributive pattern is on
the verge to the Northern group.
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assistance strategy of the Central cluster is primarily directed towards the
protection of workers and places more emphasis on horizontal redistribution.
Accordingly, medium income levels benefit to a comparatively large degree,
while the low income groups are still covered by minimum income guarantees.
As the latter are all but absent in the Southern cluster, the Bismarck strategy
adopted produces only minor vertical redistribution. Finally, with regard to the
Northern cluster, the Beveridge-con-social-allowance strategy produces a
redistributive pattern half-way between the Central and the British cluster, being
more favourable to low income groups than the Central cluster, whereas high
income groups benefit stronger than in the British group.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the linkage between social security strategies and redistributive
effects in European social transfer systems has been examined. After identifying
and discussing the three main social security strategies relevant for Europe, we
have developed a classification for European social transfer systems on the basis
of their adopted strategy mix. According to the results of the cluster analyses
conducted European social transfer systems may be classified into four broad
regimes which we referred to as the Southern cluster, the Central cluster, the
British cluster and the Northern cluster. Apart from some border-line cases, the
European countries may be assigned to these clusters fairly clearly.
Finally, the linkage between the class assignment of the social transfer
systems and their redistributive pattern has been investigated. We have found
that redistributive patterns are strikingly similar for countries belonging to the
same cluster but differ markedly between groups. In particular, social transfer
systems of the British cluster are highly favourable to the lower income groups.
whereas the Central cluster are comparatively favourable to medium income
levels.
We thus conclude that the redistributive effects of social transfer systems are
heavily influenced by the adopted social security mix. Considering the high
figures of redistributive efficiency for the British cluster and the prominent role
of means tests in these countries, the results seem to support the preference of
many economists for means-tested benefits. However, taking into account the
risk of poverty and savings traps as well as the possible consequence of
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increasing social division, this may prove a short-sided conclusion. With regards
to an assessment of efficiency, a detailed investigation of social mobility and
social exclusion in these countries seems highly desirably.
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Appendix A
The following indicators were used as input variables for the cluster analyses:
Funding issues:
(a) Share of Top in GDP
This variable is introduced to capture the total effort invested in social
transfers. Top encompasses monetary social security benefits, excluding
age and survivors pensions. Transfers in kind are not included in Top.
Figures are calculated on the basis of data given in EUROSTAT 1999c
and refer to 1994.
(b) Ratio of funding by state to funding by contributions
This variable is employed to depict the significance of funding by
contributions. It reports the amount of funding for total social security
expenditures provided by the state in relation to the total amount of
funding provided by direct contributions of covered persons and
employers. Figures were calculated from data given in EUROSTAT
1999c and refer to 1994.
2. Level of protection:
(a) Minimum income guaranteed in relation to median equivalized income
for single adults
This variable is designed to capture the minimum amount of protection
an individual can expect, irrespective of his or her age, health
conditions or marital status. Data on minimum income guaranteed for
single adults are taken from Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales
(1996) and report total monthly benefits including additional
allowances in 01/01/1995. Data on median equivalized income for
single adults are given in EUROSTAT 1999b and refer to the reporting
year 1994.
(b) Indicator for income replacement rates of Top
This indicator is designed to depict the level of protection as designed
in social security regulations. Using information from MISSOC (1995),
income replacement is evaluated on the basis of regulations concerning
benefits in case of sickness, invalidity, employment injuries and
unemployment. Countries were classified into four categories and
assigned the integer values 1 to 4, depending on whether regular
Appendix B 
Values of indicator variables, normalized to [0,1] 
Countries listed in  descending order 
 Share of Top in 
GDP 
FIN 1.000 
DK 0.800 
NL 0.791 
SE 0.767 
B 0.601 
UK 0.361 
D 0.343 
E 0.310 
IRL 0.292 
A 0.288 
F 0.273 
EL 0.045 
P 0.038 
I 0.000 
L no data av. 
 Funding Ratio  
State to Direct 
Contributions 
DK 1.000 
IRL 0.406 
UK 0.327 
SE 0.241 
FIN 0.179 
L 0.158 
P 0.138 
EL 0.103 
I 0.097 
A 0.090 
D 0.054 
E 0.046 
B 0.018 
F 0.010 
NL 0.000 
 Share of Means 
Tested Benefits 
IRL 1.000 
UK 0.551 
E 0.391 
D 0.285 
FIN 0.285 
F 0.258 
NL 0.216 
I 0.203 
SE 0.195 
P 0.168 
EL 0.157 
A 0.110 
DK 0.067 
B 0.000 
L no data av. 
 Indicator for     
Degree of  
 Coverage 
SE 1.000 
FIN 0.929 
DK 0.929 
NL 0.857 
L 0.786 
A 0.714 
UK 0.643 
IRL 0.571 
D 0.500 
B 0.429 
F 0.357 
EL 0.214 
P 0.143 
E 0.143 
I 0.000 
 Ratio Minimum  
Income Guaran-
teed to MEI 
DK 1.000 
IRL 0.926 
UK 0.900 
NL 0.745 
B 0.712 
D 0.683 
L 0.644 
F 0.481 
A 0.423 
I 0.327 
P 0.000 
EL 0.000 
E 0.000 
FIN no data av. 
SE no data av. 
 Indicator for          
Earnings Repl. 
Rate 
SE 1.000 
L 0.920 
DK 0.770 
D 0.770 
E 0.620 
NL 0.580 
FIN 0.460 
B 0.460 
A 0.310 
F 0.270 
UK 0.230 
IRL 0.230 
I 0.230 
P 0.120 
EL 0.000 
Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales  1996, EUROSTAT 1999b, 1999c, 
own calculations 
benefits are income related and low (less than 50% for unemployment
benefits or less than 70% for the remaining benefits), flat rate at about
50% or 70% of MEI respectively, income related and medium (50% to
75% or 70% to 80% respectively) or income related and high (more
than 75% or more than 80% respectively). In calculating the overall
indicator all categories were weighted equally.1
3. Conditions for benefit entitlement:
(a) Share of means tested benefits in social expenditures
This variable is designed to capture the amount of social security
benefits granted on the basis of means tests. Data are taken from
EUROSTAT 1999c and refer to 1994.
(b) Indicator for the degree of coverage
This indicator is invoked to capture the degree of overall coverage as
designed by social security regulations. On the basis of information
given in MISSOC (1995), coverage was evaluated taking into account
entitlement conditions for benefits in case of sickness, employment
injuries, invalidity, unemployment and for minimum income
guaranteed. Regulations were assigned the integer values 1 to 4 in each
category, depending on which groups of citizens are covered, the
duration of waiting periods required for entitlement and the maximum
period benefits are paid. Again, in calculating the overall indicator all
categories were weighted equally.2
                                                          
1 This weighting scheme has been chosen on the grounds that data available do not allow to
differentiate Top expenditures according to the above categories or according to the
numbers of cases concerned. Moreover, weighing categories according to their share in
total Top expenditures or numbers of cases would imply risk neutrality, which seems a
doubtful assumption, considering the very different future prospects to be expected in case
the contingency occurs.
2 The same considerations as with employment replacement rates apply.
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